Urgent Steps to Keep Nuclear Weapons and Materials Out of Terrorist Hands

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Outline

- Types of Threats and the Consequences of Failure
- Trends in Funding for Response to Threat
- Progress in Dealing with Threat
- Steps to Speed Progress and Improve Response to Threat

Types of Outsider Threats

- Large overt attack
- Multiple coordinated teams
- Significant covert attack
- Use of unusual vehicles

Types of Insider Threats

- The desperate insider
- The greedy/corrupt insider
- The ideologically sympathetic insider
- The blackmailed insider
- *Outsiders and insiders may work together*

Summary: The Nuclear Terrorist Threat

- Do terrorists want nuclear weapons? *Yes*
- Is it conceivable terrorists could make a crude bomb if they got the material? *Yes*
- Is there material that might be vulnerable to theft and transfer to terrorists? *Yes*
- Is it likely that terrorists, if they had a crude device, could smuggle it to Moscow, Washington, or New York? *Yes*

The Costs of Failure: An Appalling Scenario

- 10 KT bomb on typical workday at NYC Grand Central Station
- > 500,000 people killed
- 100s of thousands more injured
- Massive destruction in lower Manhattan
- Fallout could require massive evacuation
- Conservative *direct* costs: over $1 trillion
- Massive reverberating economic effects around the world

Recent Budgets of the DOE Nuclear Nonproliferation Account



Recent U.S. Budgets for Controlling Nuclear Weapons and Materials in and around the former Soviet Union



Note: State Department 2004 Final Enacted Assumed to Equal President's Budget Until Passage of Final Funding Bill.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Budgets in Context of Other Budget Decisions

- Iraq WMD search funding reportedly near annual U.S. contribution to G-8 Global Partnership Against Spread of WMD
- Changes in funding fall short of changes in Homeland Security and Defense spending (see next chart)

Changes in Discretionary Budget Authority Since 9/11 (FY 2001=100)



Much Has Been Accomplished to Reduce This Threat

- Unilateral Russian security upgrades
- U.S.-Russian cooperation on security
- Joint U.S.-Russian commercial efforts to destroy bomb material
- International efforts secure stockpiles of nuclear material
- International efforts to redirect weapons scientists

Progress in U.S.-Russian MPC&A Cooperative Security Upgrades on Baseline Target of 600 Metric Tons

End of FY 2002



End of FY 2003



- **Comprehensive Upgrades**
- **Rapid Upgrades**
- **Cooperative Upgrades Not Completed**

Estimates on data provided by Dep't. of Energy officials.

Projected Pace of MPC&A Upgrades, Based on FY 2002–2003 Performance



Strong Presidential Statements Highlight the Danger of Terrorists with WMD: President Bush

"The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction….History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act."

– *National Security Strategy of the United States of America,* 9/02

Strong Presidential Statements Highlight the Danger of Terrorists with WMD: President Putin

"We do not think that the major threats nowadays are presented by ICBMs…We all know exactly how New York and Washington were hit…Was it ICBMs? What threat are we talking about? We are talking about the use of mass destruction weapons terrorists may obtain—chemical weapons, biological weapons, and so on. Russia is convinced that this is what should be given the most serious thought to."

– Press conference, 1/01

But if Nuclear Terrorism Were Really Seen as a High-Priority Threat:

- End disputes slowing progress
- Make nuclear security and accounting upgrades a priority in Global Partnership
- Russia would fully fund own security upgrades, and would fund installation and upkeep of already-provided equipment
- U.S. government would help upgrade security for Russian operational tactical warhead sites

Key Priorities if the Presidents Agreed on a High-Priority Cooperative Program

- "Global cleanout": fast-paced effort to remove nuclear material from most vulnerable sites around the world
- Accelerated, strengthened MPC&A cooperation
  - Fast-paced agreed deadline
  - Focus also on sustainability
  - Security strong enough to meet post-9/11 threats
  - Presidential decision to resolve access issue and other impediments

Other Priorities if the Presidents Agreed on a High-Priority Cooperative Program

- Accelerated blend-down of HEU
- Securing and monitoring most dangerous warheads
- Strengthened global standards
- Maintain expanded support for the IAEA

The challenge

On the day after a nuclear terrorist attack, what would we wish we had done to prevent it?

Why aren't we doing it now?

For further reading…

- *Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials*
  - http://www.nti.org/cnwm
- *Letter Report from the Co-Chairs of the Joint Committee on U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Non-Proliferation,* John P. Holdren and Nikolai P. Laverov
  - http://www4.nationalacademies.org/news.nsf/isbn/s02052003?OpenDocument